INTRODUCTION
An alternative is a Condorcet winner if does not lose to any alternative in a pairwise majority vote. A social choice correspondence (SCC) is a Condorcet extension if it selects exactly the set of Condorcet winners, whenever a Condorcet winner exists. No restrictions are made when no Condorcet winner exists, except that the social choice correspondence must pick something at every preference profile. We say that we can (Nash) implement a Condorcet extension if there is a game form (or, mechanism) whose Nash equilibrium outcomes always exactly coincide with the SCC.
In this paper we study the preference domains on which we can implement Condorcet extensions. It is well known that Condorcet extensions are not Nash implementable when all strict or all weak preferences are admissible (Jackson, 2001; Saijo, 1987, e.g.) . Maskin (1999) preferences that admit Condorcet winners are admissible.
1 Our paper explores the intermediate cases, where more preferences may be admissible than just those that admit Condorcet winners, but it is not assumed that all profiles are admissible. Our finding is that if the domain of admissible preference profiles is any strict superset of those profiles that admit Condorcet winners, then no Condorcet extension on that domain is Maskin monotonic. Therefore, it will be neither strategy-proof nor Nash implementable by any mechanism.
NOTATION & ENVIRONMENT
A set of N = {1, . . ., n} of n ≥ 3 agents are to select an outcome from a finite set of alternatives X , where |X | (the number of elements of X ) is at least two. Denote by X the set of non-empty subsets of X . Each agent has complete, reflexive, and transitive preferences
where xR i y denotes that x is weakly preferred to y. Let P i denote the asymmetric part of R i ('strict preferences'). We denote the profile of all agents' preferences by R N = (R 1 , . . ., R n ). Let R be the space of all possible preferences over X and P be the space of all strict preferences over X . The domain restriction in Maskin's paper is not discussed explicitly, but clear from the proof.
Condorcet winners. Define x ∈ X to be a strong Condorcet winner at R N if, for every
. Strong Condorcet winners must be unique when they exist. Let S ⊆ R n be the preference profiles for which a strong Condorcet winner exists, and f S : S → X to be the SCF that selects the strong Condorcet winner at every
every weak Condorcet extension is a weak Condorcet consistent SCC, and every weak
Condorcet consistent SCC is a strong Condorcet extension, but the opposite relations do not hold.
To define monotonicity, we first say that an alternative x ∈ X maintains position from
y. In other words, x maintains position if, for every i, everything x was beating under R i continues to be beaten by x under R
S i and an outcome func-
In that case we say that f is Nash implementable.
The following theorem, due to Maskin (1999) , shows that monotonicity is an important necessary condition for a SCC to be Nash implementable.
Theorem (Maskin, 1999) . If a SCC f : D → X is not monotonic, then it is not Nash implementable. Maskin (1999) also proves that, with at least three agents, monotonicity is sufficient for Nash implementation when the 'No Veto Power' axiom is added. Formally, f satisfies
Theorem (Maskin, 1999) . If n ≥ 3 and f : D → X satisfies monotonicity and No Veto Power then f is Nash implementable.
We state and prove our result in the following section. Remark 2. We assume n ≥ 3. If n = 2 then every preference profile admits a weak
Condorcet winner (W = R 2 ), but there are weak Condorcet extensions that are not Nash implementable when D is large enough. Examples can be constructed easily using the necessary conditions from Dutta and Sen (1991) .
RELATED WORK
As stated in the introduction, the impossibility result under the special cases of D = P n and D = R n is well-studied. Assuming |X | ≥ 3 and D ⊇ P n , (all strict preferences are admissible), Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) prove that if f is monotonic and satisfies citizens' sovereignty (the range of f equals X ) then f must be dictatorial. Since a weak Condorcet extension on P n satisfies citizen sovereignty and is not dictatorial, this proves that it cannot be monotonic.
Amorós ( Condorcet extensions when all preferences are admissible. Their approach differs in that they take the (non-transitive) majority relation as primitive, but the result is equivalent.
All of these results require that all strict preferences be admissible, and are therefore more restrictive (more likely to generate an impossibility result) than any of the cases covered in our theorem.
If the complete indifference profile is admissible, Saijo (1987) Positive results on implementation can be obtained if a stronger equilibrium concept is used (see Palfrey and Srivastava, 1991; Peress, 2008; and Bag et al., 2009, for example) . If preferences are single-peaked (Moulin, 1980, e.g.) then implementation is also no problem, because D ⊂ S .
